CS 6301-001: Language-based Security

Dr. Kevin HaMlen
Fall 2021

Prerequisites: none*

*But if you’ve ever programmed in a functional language (ML, Haskell, Lisp, OCaml, etc.) then that will be a helpful skill. Also, if you know assembly language, that will be quite useful too.
Outline

- Course logistics
  - course objectives
  - homework grading, etc.
  - about me
- What is “Language-based Security”??
- Tentative course schedule (list of topics)
- Demo: Program-proof co-development
Course Information

- Course webpage:
  - google “kevin hamen”, click “Teaching” link

- Instructor:
  - Dr. Kevin Hamlen
  - ECSS 3.704
  - Office hours: After class (MW 2:15-3:15)
Course Objectives

- Cutting-edge research
  - Learn how to extract (the important) info from security-related research articles
  - Learn about modern efforts toward a science of computer security
  - Learn basics of programming language theory, functional programming, automated theorem-proving, etc.
  - Get your hands dirty: Implement and formally verify something

- Warning: This is a research-level class!
  - Many problems/questions are open-ended. We will be exploring the known issues together.
  - Not only is the software extremely beta, the whole concept behind the software is extremely beta!
Grading

- Homework (30%)
  - programming exercises - learn to program in Coq
  - first one ("Basics") due next Wednesday 9/1
  - see online schedule for the other six due dates
  - Recommendation: Complete them far in advance! Then you’ll be done!
  - If you have trouble, do some exercises in the online text (Pierce et al.)

- Quizzes (30%)
  - start of most class sessions (see schedule) (~15 min.)
  - covers assigned reading for the day
  - first one next Monday (8/30)

- Class participation (10%)
  - discuss article, ask questions

- Projects (30%)
  - formally verify and/or security-harden some software
  - project proposals due around mid-semester (tentatively 11/3)
  - implement during last 6 weeks of course

- No exams
Quizzes

- Approximately 8 questions each
  - multiple-choice / short answer
- Difficulty level
  - multiple-choice ≠ obvious-choice
  - main concepts (e.g., “What is this paper (really) about?”)
  - feasibility critique: main limitations, pros/cons
  - a few harder in-depth questions to test whether you caught subtle but essential details
- Warning: These articles are hard to understand!
  - contain many tiny technical details
  - I don’t test on minutiae. Don’t memorize everything.
  - But hard questions might focus on a seemingly minor item that you didn’t realize is very significant.
Comprehending Papers

- Ability to read and digest research articles (at a reasonable pace) is a learned and very valuable skill.
  - articles are extremely dense!
  - most assume background knowledge that you lack
  - I expect you to look up terms you don’t understand on your own initiative.
  - I don’t expect you to understand everything, even after doing your best to look things up.
- After reading, be sure you can answer the following:
  - What’s the MAIN discovery?
  - Why is this better/worse than alternatives?
  - What are the system’s weaknesses? How can I break it?
  - Do you understand the main definitions / notations?
About Me

- originally from the northeastern US (Buffalo, NY)
- Undergrad
  - Carnegie Mellon (computer science and math)
  - Senior thesis: Proof-Carrying Code
- Masters (’02) & Ph.D. (’06)
  - Cornell (computer science)
  - Dissertation: certifying in-lined reference monitors
- Government experience
  - Principal Investigator for over 20 US Federal cyber-security contracts with Navy, Air Force, Army, NSF, NSA, and DARPA
- Industry experience
  - Microsoft Research (Redmond & Cambridge)
  - language-based security for .NET and F#
- Personal
  - married, 8-year-old son + 6-year-old twin boys
  - Christian
COVID Policy

- In-person attendance is the assumed (default) participation mode
- Please DON’T come to class if...
  - you have symptoms or test positive for COVID
  - you have had close contact with an infected individual and are awaiting test results
- Otherwise please DO come to class (if you are in the country)
- Accommodations will be made for students who cannot attend
  - quizzes can be made up or dropped
  - lectures can be recorded for you
- Socially distance within classroom (e.g., non-adjacent seating when possible)
- Masks not required (Texas governor’s executive order) but use your best judgment and be respectful of others’ health concerns
What is LBS?

- Leveraging theory of programming language design and compiler construction to enforce software security
- Two domains of research:
  - new languages/tools for creating secure software from scratch
  - securing legacy code (e.g., written in C)
- Three stages of enforcement
  - static (find & fix vulnerabilities before runtime)
  - dynamic (detect and block attacks at runtime)
  - audit (recover and assign blame after an attack)
Grand Challenge: Secure Program Development

- Is it possible to develop secure software that is guaranteed to be vulnerability-free?
- Scenario: You are hired to write the control software for a nuclear reactor.
  - It must NEVER fail (millions of lives at stake)
  - It must cope with adversarial conditions (prime target)
  - It must be efficient (too slow = meltdown)
- Traditional approaches
  - Test a lot ("It didn’t crash today...")
  - Write a proof (consisting of about 10K pages of math)
    - How do we know there isn’t a bug in the proof??
Grand Challenge: Securing Legacy Code

- Scenario: NSA wants secure software on their office workstations.
  - need web browsers, document readers, etc.
  - need internet connectivity
  - stores and/or reads top secret documents
  - not feasible to rebuild the entire universe of software from the ground up
  - software is proprietary (and usually closed-source)
- How to stop secrets from leaking?
Grand Challenge:  
**A Science of Security**

- Can we develop a science of security like we have for math or physics?
  - Are there iron-clad “proofs” of security?
  - What does it even mean for a system to be “secure”?
- Are there metrics for security? Can we determine that one software system is “more secure” than other? Can we prove that it’s “80% secure”?
- Are there some security policies that are provably unenforceable? Can we prove that certain enforcement mechanisms can enforce certain classes of policies and not others?
Tentative List of Topics

- First 4 weeks:
  - Developing machine-verified software with Coq
  - basis for homework and projects
- Next 2 weeks: LBS foundations
- After that, move into cutting-edge research:
  - Software Model-checking
  - Software Fault Isolation
  - Code-injection and code-reuse attacks & defenses
  - Artificial Software Diversity and Obfuscation
  - Cyber offense (“active defense”)
  - Information flow controls (confidentiality enforcement)
  - Web scripting security
  - In-lined Reference Monitoring
  - Cyber-deceptive Software Engineering
Four vulnerability stories

A Tale of Security Woes:
Tale #1: Linux GHOST

- Bug in the Linux glibc library
- Discovered by Qualys researchers during a routine code audit in 2015
- Affects all code that uses glibc for host-lookups (i.e., nearly all Linux networking software) between 2000-2013
- Can you spot the bug?

```c
int __nss_hostname_digits_dots( ... ) {
    ...

    size_needed = sizeof(*host_addr) + sizeof(*h_addr_ptrs) + strlen(name) + 1;

    *buffer = (char*) malloc(size_needed);
    ...

    35 lines of code ...

    host_addr = (host_addr_t*) *buffer;
    h_addr_ptrs = (host_addr_list_t*)((char*) host_addr + sizeof(*host_addr));
    h_alias_ptr = (char**)((char*) h_addr_ptrs + sizeof(*h_addr_ptrs));
    hostname = (char*) h_alias_ptr + sizeof(*h_alias_ptr);

    ...
```
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   3 size_needed = sizeof(*host_addr) + sizeof(*h_addr_ptrs) + strlen(name) + 1;
   4 *buffer = (char*) malloc(size_needed);
   ...
   35 lines of code ...

   5 host_addr = (host_addr_t*) *buffer;
   6 h_addr_ptrs = (host_addr_list_t*) ((char*) host_addr + sizeof(*host_addr));
   7 h_alias_ptr = (char**) ((char*) h_addr_ptrs + sizeof(*h_addr_ptrs));
   8 hostname = (char*) h_alias_ptr + sizeof(*h_alias_ptr);
   ...
```
Is it really that big a deal?

Qualys was able to take complete remote control of affected Linux machines merely by sending them a maliciously crafted email (unread!).

Can you figure out how they did it?
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Can you figure out how they did it?
Tale #2: Heartbleed

- Bug in OpenSSL (secure web communications!) found by Codenomicon in 2014
- Buffer over-read error in implementation of Heartbeat TLS protocol
- Exposed ~66% of the internet to theft of encryption keys between 2011-2014
- Still highly exploitable because OpenSSL is so pervasive, cannot always be patched in the wild.
- Heartbeat packets deemed so innocuous, they were not even logged during the zero-day window.

```c
int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) {
    unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0];
    unsigned int len;
    n2s(p, len);
    ...  
    buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + len + padding);
    bp = buffer;
    *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
    s2n(len, bp);
    memcpy(bp, p, len);
    bp += len;
    ...  
```
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    ...
```
Tale #3: Shellshock

- Undocumented feature (not a bug!) discovered in Linux bash shell (by IT manager Stephane Chazelas in his spare time!) in 2014
- Bash command-parser interprets certain text in environment variables as code and executes it during parsing(?!)
- Impact: All Linux software storing user-provided data in environment variables susceptible to complete remote compromise.
- Zero-day window: 25 years(!!) (198?-2014)

```c
void initialize_shell_variables(char **env, int privmode) {
    ...
    for (string_index = 0; string = env[string_index++]; ) {
        ...
        if (privmode==0 && read_but_dont_execute == 0 && STREQN("() {", string, 4)) {
            ...
            parse_and_execute(temp_string, name, SEVAL_NONINT|SEVAL_NOHIST);
            ...
        }
    }
```
Tale #4: StageFright

- Series of 8 critical vulnerabilities discovered in Android OS 2014-2015
- Allows complete remote hijacking of 95% of Android devices
- No user interaction required! (merely receiving a malformed MMS message triggers bug)

```c
status_t SampleTable::setTimeToSampleParams(...) {
    uint32_t mTimeToSampleCount = U32_AT(&header[4]);
    uint64_t allocSize = mTimeToSampleCount * 2 * sizeof(uint32_t);
    if (allocSize > SIZE_MAX) return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
    mTimeToSample = new uint32_t[mTimeToSampleCount * 2];
    ...
```
Tale #4: StageFright

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    ...
```
Is secure code development even possible?

- Open-source failed in all these instances.
  - questionable whether open-source model actually provides greater security
- Unit testing didn’t work in these cases either.
  - input space is just too large to cover with tests
- What about better programming languages?
  - But Shellshock was a misguided design choice.
  - Many zero-days discovered in Java every year (often in its runtime libs, which aren’t written in Java!)
- What’s the answer?
Coq: Programming with Proofs

- Coq
  - stands for “Calculus of Constructions” (the underlying type theory of the system)
    - named after mathematician Thierry Coquand
  - developed by INRIA, France over last decade
  - most powerful secure software development system to date (in my opinion)

- Specification language based on ML/OCaml
  - all loops are recursive (no while/for loops)
  - immutable variables (variables are assign-once!)
  - first-class functions
  - parametrically polymorphic
  - higher-order, dependent type system (!)

- Demo
Homework

- Download and install Coq
  - see links to Coq page from course web page
  - use version 8.13 or above

- Read for next time:
  - “Preface” of the Software Foundations online text (see course web page).
  - Read the “Basics” chapter up to first exercise
  - Solve first two exercises (nandb, andb3)