

The Role of Police Work, Economic Development, and Political Development in Countering Terrorism

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Introduction

The most obvious first step in any serious analytic discussion of terrorism turns out to be one of the most problematic: defining what “terrorism” means. The terms “terrorist” and “terrorism” have become so common in discussions of present day threats to local and global security that it is easy to forget they do not always mean the same thing to everyone who uses them. Some, such as Walter Laqueur, argue against trying to define terrorism at all, because there are “many terrorisms” that depend on the specific characteristics of various movements and the tactics they employ.¹ Yet there are too many commonalities in the nature of the tactic itself for such a highly particularized approach to seem satisfying.

In political speech, though it is rarely made explicit, the word “terrorist” is often used to refer to someone who uses violence to further a cause with which the speaker disagrees, and “freedom fighter” to refer to someone who uses violence to further a cause that is more acceptable. This may be effective political rhetoric, but it will not help us understand the phenomenon or, more important, develop policies for effectively countering it. For that we need analytically cleaner definition.

There are many definitions of terrorism extant.² Some are quite flamboyant, such as “warfare deliberately waged against civilizations with the purpose of destroying their

will to support either their leaders or policies that the agents of such violence find objectionable.”³ Others are more carefully structured. Bruce Hoffman, who has spent many years studying terrorism, has defined terrorism as “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in pursuit of political change.”⁴ Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson add, “In today’s world, terrorism involves the deliberate and often random maiming and killing of noncombatants for political effect by subnational groups and nonstate actors.”⁵

The U.S. Department of State, while admitting that “No one definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance,” relies on the definition written into U.S. statute law: “The term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”⁶ It is interesting to note that the State Department goes beyond the usual “innocent civilians” included as defining targets of terrorism to explicitly add “military personnel who are unarmed/and/or not on duty” to the category of “noncombatants”, and then to incorporate “as acts of terrorism, attacks on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site...”⁷

I define “terrorism” simply as violence or the threat of violence carried out with the express purpose of creating fear and alarm, in order to accomplish some overriding objective. Like the State Department definition, I see terrorism as a tactic, not an end in itself. But while the State Department, Hoffman, Art, Richardson and many others specify that the objective terrorists are trying to achieve must be political, I do not believe it is useful or appropriate to exclude ideological, social, or religious objectives. Furthermore, since it is

the nature of the act committed that makes it terrorism, not what sort of group is committing it, the definition of terrorism should not exclude the activities of governments or their agencies. Though we often think of terrorism as being committed by individuals and non-governmental groups, governments can also behave as terrorists. To take just one historical example, the Gestapo of Nazi era Germany was most certainly a terrorist organization.⁸

Terrorists are trying to make the public feel vulnerable, unsafe, and helpless. Most of the time, choosing victims at random is the best way for non-governmental terrorists to accomplish this. If there is no clear pattern as to which particular bus is blown up, which airliner hijacked, which building bombed, there is no obvious way to avoid becoming an innocent victim. That is very frightening.

Not every form of violent, destructive or antisocial behavior is terrorism. When an armed gang shoots bank guards in order to steal money that is a violent crime, not an act of terrorism. The violence is committed to stop the guards from interfering with the theft, not to frighten the wider population. Bombing the barracks of an opposing military force is an act of war, violent and murderous, but it is not an act of terrorism. It attacks those who are directly involved in the activity the attackers are trying to oppose, not randomly chosen innocent victims. The act of a habitual sex offender in kidnapping, raping and murdering a more or less randomly chosen innocent victim is a vicious and brutal crime, but it is also not terrorism. Though it may well cause the public to be afraid, it is not done for that purpose, and it is not done in order to achieve an overriding objective.

On the other hand, suicide bombing a city marketplace to precipitate a change in government policy is an act of terrorism, no matter what kind of group commits that act. The more or less randomly chosen victims cannot directly change government behavior, but

the indiscriminate slaughter is intended to shock and frighten people into demanding that the government change direction by convincing them that they will be in danger until those policies change. Whether or not the bombing achieves that objective, it is still an act of terrorism.

In sum, acts intended to instill fear in the public, committed against more or less randomly chosen victims not themselves able to meet the attackers' demands, define terrorism and set it apart from many other forms of violence.

How Does Terrorism Compare to Crime?

All acts of terrorism committed by non-governmental groups are crimes. They involve the destruction of property, assault and murder --- or conspiracies and coercive threats to commit such crimes. Many terrorist groups also engage in other crimes, such as kidnapping, bank robbery and money laundering, to help support themselves, financially and otherwise. Governmental terrorism, which may involve such acts as prolonged arbitrary detention and torture, may or may not be criminal within the nation in which they are committed, but they are increasingly seen as criminal violations of human rights within the arena of international law. And as could be said of other forms of crime, psychologist Anthony Marsella contends that terrorism is driven by “complex psychological, situational and social determinants”.⁹ Nevertheless, terrorism is not just a subcategory of crime in general, and terrorists are not just ordinary criminals. There are important differences.

There is some sort of underlying political, social, religious, or ideological objective that drives terrorist behavior, an objective that goes beyond the kind pure financial gain or personal psychological motives that drive most of crime. This is perhaps most obvious in the case of suicide bombers.¹⁰ Marsella argues that “the deeper roots of terrorism are located within complex historical and cultural contexts that are often centuries old.” And, even though the tactic of terrorism is always despicable, the objective that any particular terrorist

group is trying to achieve may or may not be. In any case, the goals of the group (as distinct from the means they employ) may have more or less support among the general public. The motives behind criminal behavior, on the other hand, rarely have public support.

In general, criminals prefer not to be easily connected to the crimes they have committed. Most would be just as happy if no one even knew that the crime taken place. But terrorists usually try to draw attention to themselves, often claiming "credit" for their horrendous acts. That is because, in many ways, terrorism is a perverse form of theater in which terrorists play to an audience whose actions --- and perhaps, opinions --- they are trying to influence. When they hijack an aircraft, they may be playing to an audience of corporate managers who can assemble a ransom, government officials who can order their imprisoned comrades released, or whoever else has the power to meet their demands. But they are also playing to the public, whose mere presence as well as opinions and actions can put pressure on those in power to do what the terrorists want done.¹¹

The similarities between terrorism and ordinary crime imply that the way society goes about preventing and reacting to them (and to those who commit them) in the short run should be similar. In the short run, the similarities trump the key differences in underlying causes. But in the long run, where underlying causes are very important, these differences imply that terrorism and crime must be dealt with very differently.

The Role of Police and the Criminal Justice System in Counter-Terrorism

In the short run, it is appropriate for police to deal with terrorism in essentially the same way they deal with all serious violent crimes --- through a combination of intelligence, investigation and action in the service of prevention, and when prevention fails, by capturing those who commit these deplorable acts. Deterrence and disruption are as important in countering terrorism, as they are in countering other forms of violent

crime and criminal conspiracy. Deterrence is unfortunately more difficult to achieve with terrorists than with criminals though, since terrorists are so often driven by dedication to a cause for which they stand ready to sacrifice their own lives. On the other hand, disruption of both criminal and terrorist activities relies crucially on the same thing --- information that is accurate and timely. Meaningful access to such high quality information depends not only on development of effective informant networks and direct infiltration of violence-oriented groups (where possible), but also on timely sharing of intelligence (and analysis) among police organizations and governmental agencies that gather the relevant information, both within and among countries. That sharing information and analysis is critical may seem obvious, but the failure to share them among relevant agencies appears to have been a major part of the reason that key components of the federal government in the U.S. failed to “connect the dots” of available information in ways that might have prevented the infamous September 11 terrorist attacks.

Police forces have an extremely important role to play in counter-terrorism in the short run. They have been much more critical in disrupting terrorist activity than the military. Many more terrorists have been put out of action by ordinary police methods than by military force. The reality is that while quick, narrowly targeted military strikes against isolated terrorist training camps may have some value, the heavy hand of broader, longer-term military campaigns --- especially in areas heavily populated by innocent civilians --- are at least as likely to create new generations of terrorists as to destroy those currently active.

The police are not, and in general, cannot be held responsible for addressing the underlying causes of terrorism any more than they can be held responsible for addressing the underlying causes of crime. Those causes are societal and psychological. Overcoming them is not within the realm of what we can reasonably expect police to accomplish. The sole exception --- and it is a very important one, especially in the case of terrorism --- is overreaction. While it is difficult to understand how ordinary criminals could gain from provoking stronger law enforcement, one of the most common terrorist strategies is to intentionally try to provoke the government in general, and the police in particular, to use excessive force and engage in widespread violations of human rights. They believe that this will at least alienate the people from their government, and perhaps de-legitimize it in the eyes of the public and the wider world. Terrorists also believe, with some justification, that it may make it easier for them to recruit, and even build wider support for the terrorist cause. Therefore, it may be exceedingly difficult to maintain calm, firm, even-handed police behavior in the face of the kind of violence and wanton murder committed by terrorist groups, but it is extremely important to do so.

Which Terrorists Are the Most Dangerous? A Taxonomy

Experts have warned about the dangers of nuclear terrorism and its equivalents at least since the 1960s. But as yet, there has been no publicly reported case of terrorists (or criminals) doing the kind of massive damage that could result from large-scale use of the technologies of mass destruction. Why not?

It cannot be because of a moral revulsion against taking innocent lives, since the taking of innocent lives is the terrorist's stock in trade. It is possible that terrorists might be inhibited by a belief that murder and destruction on a massive scale would invite ferocious

retaliation. But decades of experience show that terrorists are willing to risk ferocious retaliation, and as I have argued, sometimes try to provoke it. Another possibility is that so far, terrorists have believed that committing acts of mass destruction would get in the way of achieving their objectives. The credibility of this explanation depends on what kind of group we are considering. Terrorist groups are not clones of each other. Understanding what makes them different is important to judging how likely it is that any particular group will engage in the terrorism of large-scale mass destruction. It is also the key to allocating available counter-terrorist resources --- such police and information-gathering agencies --- intelligently and developing more effective countermeasures.

There have been a variety of useful attempts to categorize terrorism on the basis of the motives of terrorist groups or the methods they employ.¹² I believe what is most needed is a system for distinguishing among terrorist groups on the basis of the characteristics that are relevant to just how likely they might be to engage in the acts of extreme terrorism that are still waiting in the wings. My own crude first effort at creating such a taxonomy was based on five main distinguishing characteristics. I offer it as a simple illustration of the feasibility and potential usefulness of this approach.¹³

The first and perhaps most obvious distinction is between domestic groups and international terrorists.¹⁴ Spain's Basque separatist ETA is an example of a domestic group that actively used terrorist tactics in the 1980s and appears to have recently returned to them, while Al Qaeda is perhaps the best-known terrorist organization operating on an international scale today. Secondly, there are terrorists and terrorist organizations that have relatively well-defined, specific political goals, but the goals of others are much more vague, general, ideological and/or anarchic. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) used terrorist tactics in its early years to raise public awareness of the plight of disenfranchised Palestinian Arabs and gain support for establishing an independent Palestinian State. Similarly, the goal behind the terrorist tactics used (and it appears, recently abandoned) by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was also clear, specific and political: to end British rule in

Northern Ireland. By contrast, the U.S. Symbionese Liberation Army, made famous by its kidnapping of newspaper heiress Patricia Hearst in the mid-1970s, had only the most general, ideological, anti-capitalist goals. The long terrorist career of Ted Kaczinsky, the infamous American “Unabomber” was aimed at promoting vague anti-technology goals. And the self-proclaimed goal of Shoko Asahara, the leader of the Japanese terrorist cult Aum Shinrikyo, perhaps most infamous for its lethal release of poison gas in the Tokyo subways in 1995, was to "help souls on earth achieve 'ultimate freedom, ultimate happiness and ultimate joy.'"¹⁵

Asahara's statement leads naturally to a third, related characteristic that differentiates terrorists from each other: some are rational and some are not. There is a temptation and a desire to believe that anyone who would engage in brutal terrorist actions cannot be rational. But that is not true. Rationality is a matter of logic, not morality. It simply means that the tactics used are logically related to the goals being pursued. The German Nazis were vicious and their behavior despicable and profoundly immoral, but not illogical. At least in the short term, their tactics led them step-by-step closer to their goals of genocide, conquest and control.

Non-rational behavior includes both irrationality (in the sense of insanity) and behavior that is not necessarily insane, but is driven by something other than logic. Emotion, culture, tradition and religion are important non-rational drivers of human behavior. For a business owner to refuse to do buy from the lowest-cost supplier because that firm is run by someone who once insulted the business owner may not be rational, but it is easy to understand and certainly not crazy. Similarly, belief in God and adherence to the ceremonies of a particular religion is not a matter of logic; it is a matter of faith. And while faith may not be logical, it is not irrational.

Whether or not terrorist tactics actually advanced the goals of a politically-oriented group such as the IRA or the PLO, the decision to use them, though reprehensible, was still rational: terrorism might logically have led them where they wanted to go. It is difficult,

however, to imagine by what logic the terrorist activities of Aum Shinrikyo can be related to their spiritual goal of helping people on Earth to attain "ultimate freedom, ultimate happiness and ultimate joy."

A fourth factor that differentiates terrorist groups is the degree of support for their underlying goals. Whether or not the public approves of their tactics, terrorist groups fighting for a popular cause behave differently than those whose *goals* are considered extremist and out of touch. Everything else being equal, when the cause is popular, it will be easier for the group to recruit members, raise funds and find hiding places for their weapons and for themselves. Those that are rational will cultivate this sponsorship, and take care when choosing their targets and tactics to avoid alienating their supporters. They will try to avoid catching their potential allies in the web of innocent victims. Groups with little or no public support are less inhibited in their choice of victims. They may believe that acts of horrific violence are the only way to shock what they see as a complacent or submissive public into action. It is a safe bet that, despite their lack of support, most see themselves as the leading edge of a great movement, and think that once the public awakens, a mass of supporters will rise up and carry them to victory.

Finally, different terrorist groups face off against different kinds of opponents. Some see a very specific enemy, such as the top executives of a particular company (or industry) or the political leaders of a specific country. Others see a much larger enemy, such as all nonwhites or all non-Christians, or a vaguely defined group, such as the "international Jewish financial conspiracy." The nature of their perceived enemy affects the kinds of actions they take and the intensity of the violence they commit. The range of likely targets and the degree of violence tend to be greater when they define their enemy as "the national government" or "the Jews" than when their target is the management of Exxon or the ruling party in Britain.

To summarize, the five distinguishing factors are:

- *geopolitical focus* (Are they domestic or international in focus and if international are they state sponsored?)
- *nature, specificity and achievability of goals* (Are their goals vague and ideological or specific and political?)
- *rationality* (Is their behavior driven by logic?)
- *public support for their goals* (How much public support is there for their goals as opposed to their tactics?)
- *size and character of their enemy* (Is their opponent a relatively small and specific group of decision makers or a much larger and more generalized class of people?)

Rational domestic terrorists with clearly defined and potentially achievable political objectives are most likely to see the most extreme forms of terrorism as counterproductive. Because they see their terrorist acts as acts of resistance and rebellion that will eventually rally their silent, disempowered supporters to the cause, they must always balance the shock effect of the damage they do against the support they will lose if their violence becomes too extreme. Except in situations of complete desperation, groups of this type are almost certain to see in advance that acts of mass destruction would be disastrous tactical blunders.

Rational international terrorist groups with clearly defined and potentially achievable political objectives are somewhat more likely to escalate the level of violence. If they are playing to a domestic audience and if most of the violence they do is outside the borders of their home country, they may feel that spectacular acts of destruction will not alienate and may even encourage those who support their cause at home. This might be especially true, for example, of a terrorist group attacking targets inside the borders of a nation whose military is occupying the terrorists' home country. However, if the terrorists are also trying to influence the wider international community to support their cause, acts of extraordinary violence are not likely to seem appealing.

Domestic or international terrorist groups whose objectives are much more general or ill formed, whose attitudes are much more nihilistic, and who are not all that rational ---

such as doomsday religious cults, racist and ideological extremists, and those who are in the grip of profound mental illness --- are an entirely different story. They are less likely to be deterred by worries about alienating supporters and may find devastating acts of terrorism an appealing, unparalleled opportunity to exercise their power. Domsday cults could even see such acts as a way of hastening the salvation they believe will follow the coming cataclysm. Groups of this sort are extremely dangerous.

With a doomsday philosophy and considerable scientific talent on board, Aum Shinrikyo was a good case in point. This well-financed cult not only committed an act of nerve gas terrorism, but also was apparently preparing for much more deadly and devastating uses of chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons. The powerful control exerted over Aum's members by its charismatic but mentally disturbed founder, combined with the group's nihilistic orientation and substantial resources, was an almost perfect recipe for the terrorism of mass destruction.

Undermining Terrorism in the Long Run: The Role of Economic and Political Development

All but the craziest, most isolated individual terrorists are to some degree dependent on and trying to build support among a broader public, at least for their cause if not for their tactics. Most sub-national terrorists do not have the benefit of a wealthy patron or the active support of a state, but even those that do must be able to recruit operatives. They also have to be able to coordinate activities, move people and supplies to where they need them to be, and find secure places to hide operatives and necessary materiel. The terrorists must also have access to locations and facilities where they can do whatever training or preparation is necessary without getting caught, or even detected, by

those who are trying to stop them. All of this is much, much easier to do successfully if there is a base of support among a somewhat wider public.

Of course, if they can find them, it might not be that difficult for any terrorist group to recruit deranged loners as operatives. But such people are unreliable and uncontrollable, and are therefore threatening to the viability of the group. If the group wants to recruit operatives that are more stable, and build the networks that are necessary to support them, it must have a cause that can convince more “normal” people to engage in and actively or tacitly support terrible acts of violence that they would ordinarily find repulsive. To accomplish operations of any complexity or sophistication, the group must have access to sufficient financial means and to people of some skill. They therefore need a powerful rallying cry to recruit people who are neither desperate nor deranged, and motivate them sufficiently to get them to take extreme, perhaps terminal risks.

Unfortunately, there seem to be a number of causes and circumstances that seem to be sufficient for these purposes. Most, if not all of them, involve calls to the service of some group or force greater than the individuals themselves that are being recruited or solicited for support. It is at base an appeal to heroism, as perverted as that may seem. If the individuals involved can be made to feel that by engaging in terrorism they become the avengers of some great wrong, the voice of the voiceless, soldiers for the weak and oppressed, they can be made not only ready but eager to perpetrate these horrific acts of violence against innocent people who have never directly done them any harm.

It is certainly true that individuals who, correctly or incorrectly, consider themselves personally (or their close friends and families) to be victims of economic and political oppression and marginalization are the easiest to recruit to “fight back” against

those who they can be convinced are their victimizers --- either by directly engaging in terrorism or by supporting it one way or another. But there is little doubt that those who are not particularly oppressed or disadvantaged economically or politically can feel part of a group that is somehow under siege and so behave in a similar way. For example, it seems to be true that those who were integral to acts of terrorism committed by the IRA were not necessarily the most disadvantaged of the Catholics in Northern Ireland, and the bulk of their financial supporters in the U.S. were nowhere near destitute. But, in one way or another, they all felt themselves to be fighters against the forces responsible for the economic and political marginalization of “their people”.

Similarly, the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks against the US were certainly far from the most disadvantaged people in the world. Most of them were apparently more or less middle class, and reasonably well educated. At the same time, I am quite sure they saw themselves as striking a blow for “their oppressed people”, who they most likely thought of as their “Muslim brothers” forced to bear the insult of having the soldiers of “foreign infidels” (American military forces) in their holiest of lands (Saudi Arabia) by a Saudi government they believe to be supported by and operating in the service of those same “infidels”. They may also have seen themselves striking a blow against America as a supporter of Israel on behalf of their fellow Muslims in Palestine, who are indisputably in dire straits.

It is important to understand that none of this should be taken as in any sense justifying terrorism in general or any specific terrorist act. No matter who commits terrorist acts, no matter what their cause, I do not believe that terrorism is ever justified.

But undermining terrorism requires understanding why those who engage in it do what they do, and that requires understanding how *they* might be looking at the situation.

The feeling that whatever group people define as “their people” are not respected, that their views and needs are not taken seriously by others, can also be a strong motivation toward violence. Short-circuiting this violent urge does not require that “their people’s” worldview prevail, or that “their people” take control. It can often be short circuited by simply opening up more peaceful political avenues for getting their agenda heard, that is, by political development. One possibility is giving them some sort of seat at the political table, not necessarily a dominant one --- much in the way that Israel, for example, has within its own political system brought together politicians of vastly disparate views into “national unity” governments from time to time. Everyone in such a government has meaningful input into the policy process, but not everyone necessarily has a substantial impact on every policy that is ultimately chosen.

Perhaps a better example: In the 1980s, there was a public TV documentary, “Costa Rica: A Child in the Wind”, that included an in-depth look at Costa Rican political attitudes. At one point the North American interviewer, shocked on learning that communists held about 4% of the legislative seats, said something like, “You’ve got COMMUNISTS in the legislature!” To which the Costa Rican official he was interviewing said something like, “Yes. We do. We decided we’d rather have them in the legislature shouting at us than in the hills shooting at us.”

I am not suggesting that all terrorist groups should be given full political status. That does not make sense. But I am saying that providing better means for a wide variety of groups with real political agendas (not doomsday religious cults or psychopaths) to get

themselves heard would go a long distance to diffusing the feelings of frustration and marginalization that can lead some people to turn to terrorism or to support it. That is why political development is a key element of effective counter-terrorism.

Economic development is also a key element of effective counter-terrorism. People who find themselves or “their people” living in desperate economic straights, and who confront a future that promises only more of the same, are more likely to reach for extreme solutions, because they have that much less to lose. They are easier for demagogues and extremists to manipulate. People in better economic condition, who face a broader range of real opportunity for improving their future economic wellbeing, are less likely to want to tear things up. They not only have a higher level of material wellbeing, they have more of a sense that they and “their people” are in control of their lives, that the future is theirs to win. This does not guarantee that nothing will ever turn them onto a violent path --- any more than being very wealthy guarantees that a person will turn away from stealing other people’s money --- witness the Enron, Worldcom, and other corporate scandals. But it certainly helps.

Raising the economic prospects and political status of the larger group of which the terrorists and their supporters feel part will certainly not solve all conflicts or resolve all grievances. But it should make it increasingly difficult for the terrorists to recruit operatives, and seriously weaken financial and other forms of support among those who feel connected to that same larger group. It is in that sense, then, that economic and political development can help to dry up the pool of potential terrorists --- and the wider support base for terrorist groups --- in the long run.

From the perspective of international and cross-cultural psychology, Anthony Marsella has written, “vigilance... and the elimination of terrorist resources.... potent though they may be, can never be sufficient to stem the tide of terrorism, which springs from human discontent and resentment of inequality and indifference and from the widespread beliefs that violence is justified in the face of oppression and insult.”¹⁶ From the perspective of political economy, I certainly agree. Since the crux of the problem lies in the economic and political marginalization, frustration and humiliation of those the terrorists see as “their people”, it follows that the approach to development that should be most effective against terrorism is one that not only reaches out directly to the most marginalized, disaffected and disadvantaged of those people, but does so in a way that gives them a sense of empowerment, self-worth, dignity and respect.

Some approaches to development are more likely to do this than others. For example, in both the economic and political arenas, encouraging, supporting and facilitating the development of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can be extremely useful in achieving the kind of deep and wide outreach needed. Care must be taken to assure that these are real grass roots organizations and not “Astroturf” NGOs --- those that look like grass-roots organizations from a distance, but actually represent the interests of influential business or governing elites in the country. If counter-terrorism is the objective, the point is to give voice to the voiceless by providing nonviolent paths for them to make themselves heard and to get their concerns on the agenda. A strong and vibrant civil society, in the form of real grass-roots NGOs, is one way to help invigorate the sense of being active, meaningful participants in political and economic life.

Conclusion

Because terrorism is such a violent tactic, because it inflicts so much pain on the innocent, it fills us with anger and the urge to strike back even more violently against those who we think might even have encouraged, let alone done such despicable things. That is easy to understand. But that way lies nothing but more pain, more destruction, more taking of innocent lives. It is not only profoundly immoral; it is profoundly ineffective.

If anyone needs proof of the futility of this kind of response as a counter-terrorist strategy, consider the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For decades, Israel has doggedly followed a policy of responding to any act of terrorism with violent retaliation. A lot of people have died as a result, but terrorism continues to be a palpable ongoing daily threat against the lives of everyone in Israel. What has been accomplished? The Israeli's live in fear; the Palestinians live in misery. That is no way for anyone to live.

There are much more effective ways to respond to terrorism, and even more important, to prevent it. In the short run, high quality intelligence gathering and police work are the most critical elements of a successful strategy. But in the long run, encouraging economic and political development is the single most effective counter-terrorist approach, because it is the only one that directly addresses the marginalization, frustration and humiliation of peoples that breeds terrorism, as well as many other forms of violence and inhumanity.

¹ Laqueur, Walter, No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Continuum, 2003).

² See for example, the discussion in Miller, M. and File, J., Terrorism Factbook (Peoria, Illinois: Bollix Press, 2001)

³ Carr, C., The Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare Against Civilians, Why It Has Always Failed and Why It Will Fail Again (New York: Random House, 2002), p.6.

⁴ Hoffman, Bruce, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p.43..

⁵ Art, Robert J. and Richardson, Louise, "Introduction" in Art, Robert J. and Richardson, Louise, editors, Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2007), p.1.

⁶ U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2001 (Washington, D.C.: May 2002), p.xvi. This definition of terrorism appears in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656F(d).

⁷ Ibid. p.xvi, fn 1.

⁸ In fact, the term "terrorism" was apparently first applied to the behavior of a government --- the infamous Maximilien Robespierre's Jacobin government of France, during the "Reign of Terror" between the summer of 1793 and the summer of 1794 that followed the French Revolution.

⁹ Marsella, Anthony J., "Reflections on International Terrorism: Issues, Concepts and Directions", in Maghaddam, Fathali M. and Marsella, Anthony J., editors, Understanding Terrorism: Psychosocial Roots, Consequences and Interventions (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 2004), p.11.

¹⁰ For an unusually penetrating analysis of suicide bombing, see Bloom, Mia, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).

¹¹ Those actually taken hostage by terrorists cannot meet the terrorist demands, any more than can those maimed when a school is bombed or killed by a murderous spray of gunfire in a hotel lobby. Nor are they in any position to apply pressure to the people who have that power. They just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Innocent victims, they have become unwitting players caught up in a real-life drama, the cannon fodder of terrorism.

¹² For example, see Post, J.M., "Differentiating the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism: Motivations and Constraints", Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 8, pp.187-200.

¹³ A more elaborated discussion of this crude first attempt at creating a taxonomy that can focus attention on the most dangerous terrorist groups appears in Chapter Two of Dumas, Lloyd J., Lethal Arrogance: Human Fallibility and Dangerous Technologies (New York: St. Martin's Press/Palgrave, 1999)

¹⁴ Germany's left-wing Red Army Faction, France's right-wing Federation for National European Action, America's white supremacist The Order, Spain's Basque separatist ETA and Peru's revolutionary Shining Path are examples of domestic terrorist groups active in the 1980s. On the other hand, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Japanese Red Army, Hamas, the Jewish Defense League and the Armenian Secret Army are historical examples of internationally focused terrorist groups. Some have straddled the boundary. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) carried out most of its attacks inside Northern Ireland (against both Irish and English targets), but it was also responsible for more than a few terrorist bombings in England.

¹⁵ Kristof, Nicholas D., "At Trial in Tokyo, Guru Says Aim Was to Give 'Ultimate Joy'", New York Times (April 25, 1996).

¹⁶ Op.cit., Marsella, p.13.